


A COMPARISON OF HUMAN AND ROBOTIC SERVICING OF THE HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE



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Preface

- This talk is not:
 - A humans vs. robots contest
 - About what could we do with tomorrow's robots or manned missions
 - A cost comparison
 - The result of a hypothetical study
- This talk <u>is</u> intended to offer some lessons learned from an actual servicing mission that was worked hard for both a human and robotic implementation
- Views and opinions expressed in this talk are those of the author alone, and do not represent the official positions of any organization or company, including the Hubble Space Telescope Program or NASA



Outline

- SM4 Background
- Interfaces
- Tools
- Mission Duration
- Flexibility
- Adaptability
- Conclusions

SM4 BACKGROUND

HST as last seen in 2002

Origins of Servicing Mission 4 (SM4)

- Planning for SM4 goes back at least to 1996
 - Last planned shuttle servicing mission to Hubble
 - AO that led to selection of Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) released in Nov 1996
 - Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3) started in 1997
 - Servicing Mission 3 conducted in March 2002
- Critical Design Review conducted in Sept 2002
 - Baselined manifest (in priority order):
 - 3 Rate Sensing Units (RSUs 2 gyros each)
 - 2 Battery Module Assemblies (BMAs 3 batteries each)
 - COS
 - WFC3
 - Aft Shroud Cooling Systems (ASCS)
 - New Outer Blanket Layer 7,8 (NOBLs)(Multi Layer Insulation repair)
 - Fine Guidance Sensor 3R (FGS3R)
 - DMU to SIC&DH Cross-Strap (DSC) unit
 - NOBL5
 - Reboost

"What a long strange trip it's been"

May 24, 2009 - Shuttle landing

May 19, 2009 - HST redeploy

May 11, 2009 - STS-125 launch

Sep 2002 - CDR Baseline Shuttle launch date is Feb 2004

Oct 2006 - Shuttle servicing mission reinstated

Sept 2008 - Launch delayed by SI C&DH failure

Jan 2007 - ACS fails

Mar 2004 to Mar 2005 -HRSDM

Apr 2005 - Robotic mission cancelled

Aug 2004 - STIS fails

Jan 2004 - SM4 Cancellation following Columbia tragedy

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Hubble Robotic Servicing and De-orbit Mission

HRSDM was worked hard for just over a year

Incorporated modified shuttle arm and ISS Dextre robot

■ 1000+ person team


 GSFC, Lockheed, Ball, Draper, Orbital, Jackson & Tull, Aerojet, MDRobotics, STScl, UMD, JSC, KSC, MSFC, JPL, CSA, ESA

- Scrutinized
 - 21 member IPAO Review Team
 - 19 member GSFC Review Board
 - 53 reviews (including peer)
 - 912 RFAs (514 closed by cancellation)
- April 2008 planned launch date
- Carried through an extremely successful PDR
- Terminated in April 2005 due to cost and development risk and renewed possibility of shuttle-based SM4

INTERFACES



Gyro location on HST




Human installation of RSUs

- Six astronauts have changed out 8 RSUs on three servicing missions:
 - STS-61 (SM1, 1993) RSUs 2 & 3
 - STS-103 (SM3A, 1999) RSUs 1, 2 & 3
 - STS-125 (SM4, 2009) RSUs 1, 2 &3
- Despite continuing improvements in tools and training, problems were encountered on each mission and with different RSUs in all three positions


HRSDM WFC3 RSU Accommodation

Electronics Control Unit (ECU) Mounts Externally to Radiator




3 HST Rate Sensor Units (RSU's) Located on the WFC3 Enclosure

 RSU access was deemed so difficult for the robotic mission that it was decided to completely rehost them and their interface electronics onto WFC3




Interfaces Lessons Learned

- An interface that by design is difficult to install will never get easy no matter how hard you work at it or how many times you do it
- Interfaces that are designed to support servicing also facilitate integration and test
- The goal should be to make it...



TOOLS



A. Whipple 10/6/09 Tools used for the STIS repair on STS-125 13

COSTAR/COS STS-125 Tools

- COS change-out by EVA required 3 tools
 - Pistol Grip Tool with short adjustable extension
 - EVA ratchet with 6" rigid extension
 - Y-harness Restraint Tool
- Somewhat more complicated tools were required to accomplish the same task robotically...


COSTAR/COS HRSDM Tools

 Number and complexity of HRSDM tools was driven by requirement to employ an already flight qualified robot

CART Tool

15


A more capable robot would have required less elaborate tools



HRSDM Axial SI Ground Strap Tool

 Tools this complex require a significant development effort






GT OTCM Manipulating Axial SI Ground Strap

Tool to Engage Ground Strap Bolt

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


GT OTCM Manipulating Ground Strap using the Axial SI Ground Strap Tool

Axial SI GS Tool Model

STS-125 STIS Fastener Capture Plate

- STIS and ACS repairs made possible by an ingenious tool invented by Jason Budinoff and initially developed by 540/Swales STIS Cover Repair Tool robotic team
 - Scott Schwinger
 - Pat Bourke
 - Jason Budinoff
 - Caner Cooperrider
 - Corina Guishard
 - Carlos Hernandez
 - Alphonso Stewart
 - Kurt Wolko



Tools Lessons Learned

- The Robot vs. Tools capabilities trade is a major consideration for robotic servicing
- Design and testing of robotic tools reinforced the value of specialized tools for <u>human</u> servicing
 - This may seem obvious given how ground-based work is done but...
 - It is a subtle trade that needs to be done carefully when mass, volume, cost, schedule, and training time are constrained
- The large number of specialized tools built for and used on STS-125 were a major contributor to the amount of servicing that was accomplished
 - 55 Reflown, 7 Modified, 97 New



MISSION DURATION
















It takes a village... (actually a small town)









STS-125 EVA Timeline

- Pre-launch and as-executed times shown
- Accuracy of predicts due to extensive simulation and training (NBL and 1-g)

All significant differences due to anomalies



HRSDM Timeline



- Preliminary task execution time duration estimates shown
- We still needed to identify stable states to partition tasks to be compatible with scheduling and resource (e.g. power and thermal) constraints


Another Recent Experience with Mission Duration

- "What Spirit and Opportunity have done in 5 1/2 years on Mars, you and I could have done in a good week. Humans have a way to deal with surprises, to improvise, to change their plans on the spot. All you've got to do is look at the latest Hubble mission to see that."
 - Steve Squyres, lead scientist Mars Exploration Rover Project www.space.com/news/090715apollo11-40th-squyres.html



Mission Duration Lessons Learned


- Human servicing time is short but efficient
- Robotic servicing time is long but less constrained in duration
 - Communication latency is a real factor in duration
- High fidelity simulation and training is essential in either case to maintain mission timeline



WFPC2 A-latch Anomaly

Background

- Breakaway torque is nominally 32-35 ft-lb
- Failure threshold is 57.1 ft-lb (with FS=1.0)



STS-125 (EVA1)

- Multi-setting Torque Limiter (MTL) slipped at nominal setting of 38 ft-lb
- Followed pre-planned EVA Cribsheet:
 - No joy using Contingency MTL at 45 ft-lb
 - Success with direct ratchet (no MTL)

HRSDM

- HST Extension Tool was designed to deliver max torque of 88 ft-lb
- HRSDM tools generic force/torque margin requirement was 100% of nominal at the actuator

STIS Handrail Anomaly







To remove this cover

You have to remove this handrail

To remove the handrail you have to remove these ½-28 staked socket head cap screws

If the tool isn't fully engaged in the socket then damage can occur

That's when flexibility in the "responding to new situations" sense is important

Flexibility Lessons Learned

- Design in adequate margin
- Develop robust contingency products before launch
- Mechanical flexibility in a robot can be controlled more readily than with humans
- Humans are more readily able to respond to changing situations

ADAPTABILITY



HST SM-4 Payload


Differences Between HRSDM and STS-125 Manifests

- NOBLs 5 & 7 Carried on STS-109 (SM3B) but not high enough priority to be included in HRSDM
- STIS repair STIS failed in August 2004, at the definition stage of HRSDM. Task was determined to be doable robotically but judged too difficult/expensive relative to science return
- ACS repair ACS failed in January 2007. Task was harder than STIS-R because of access and number of cards to be replaced
- SI C&DH replacement SI C&DH failed in September 2008, three weeks before planned launch. Payload accommodations and tools were more manifest specific for HRSDM than for shuttle

Manifest Comparison

		STS-125			HRSDM	
Manifest Item	Priority	Minimum Mission Success	Full Mission Success	Human Score	Manife <i>s</i> ted	Robotic Score
RSUs	1	Yes		19	Yes	19
WFC3	2	Yes		19	Yes	19
SI C&DH	3	Yes		13	No	0
COS	4	Yes		13	Yes	13
BATTERY MODULES	5	Yes		13	Yes	13
STIS OR ACS REPAIR	6		Yes	7	No	0
FGS2	7		Yes	7	Yes	7
REMAINING INSTRUMENT REPAIR	8			4	No	0
NOBL INSTALLATION	9			3	No	0
INSTALL SCM	10			2	Yes	2
Total				100		73

- HQ and JSC approved Mission Success Criteria and Manifest Priorities enable objective weighting of manifest items
- Total manifest score normalized to 100 for STS-125
- Conclusion: Productivity of a robotic Hubble servicing mission would have been about three quarters of the human mission, assuming it was 100% successful



Thinking about Robots vs. Humans

- How robots are used on the ground?
 - For repetitive tasks where they are more economical and reliable than humans (e.g. painting, welding, circuit board assembly)
 - To extend human capabilities (e.g. cranes and micro-surgery)
 - To work in environments where humans cannot (e.g. nuclear reactors)
- We should use the same criteria to objectively guide our use of human servicing, hardwire robotics, telerobotics, and autonomous robotics

Examples of this Trade

- If the mission is a delicate one-off job like repairing ACS or a rapid turn-around job like replacing the SI C&DH then human servicing is probably most efficient
- On the other hand, the same repair at Sun-Earth L2 would have to be done robotically because of current limits on human spaceflight
- Assembling ISS modules requires robots (cranes) to extend human strength and, with people on-site, hardwire robotics is the simplest/fastest/cheapest/most reliable approach
- Relatively simple, repetitive, and long-duration jobs like communications and observing are ideally suited for (semi) autonomous robots, even in LEO where access is better
- Assembling a large structure with hundreds of identical members, regardless of location, might well justify a robotic approach due to economies of scale (repetition and duration)

Parting Thoughts

 The solution to the Working in Space problem is a continuous and evolving spectrum from EVA to autonomous robotics and any a priori choice would be wrong

 We need the full spectrum of capabilities and we need to apply them appropriately to the problems at hand